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Abstract: The place of Heinrich Hertz‟s The Principles of Mechanics in the 
history of the philosophy of science is disputed. Here I critically assess 
positivist interpretations, concluding that they are inadequate.  
 There is a group of commentators who seek to align Hertz with 
positivism, or with specific positivists such as Ernst Mach, who were 
enormously influential at the time. Max Jammer is prominent among this group, 
the most recent member of which is Joseph Kockelmans. I begin by discussing 
what Hertz and Mach had to say about one another, and I specify certain 
respects in which their views are indeed similar. I then go on to detail their 
differences, looking at Hertz‟s attitude to the atomic theory, to the mechanical 
world-view, to simplicity, to unobservables and metaphysics, and his objections 
to Newtonian forces. I conclude that the positivist interpretation of Hertz‟s 
mechanics significantly overplays its similarities to Mach‟s views.  
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Positivist Readings of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics 
One standard way of portraying the position of Heinrich Hertz‟s last 
work, The Principles of Mechanics, in the history of the philosophy of science 
has been to assimilate his views to those of Ernst Mach, casting Hertz as a 
positivist. Max Jammer, Peter Alexander, and John Blackmore took this line in 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, respectively, but it has recently been reasserted by 
Joseph Kockelmans.
1
  
Jammer regards Hertz, along with Mach and Gustav Kirchoff, as having 
an „empirical, antimetaphysical attitude‟, and as putting forward „more or less 
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 More recent work on Hertz, such as the papers in Baird, Hughes & Nordmann (1998), have tended not to take, 
but have also failed to critique, the line I am interested in here.  
positivistic doctrines in mechanics and physics‟ (Jammer 1957, p.211). Their 
common program was to eliminate the concept of force from physics, since they 
considered it to be (like Hume‟s „necessary connection‟ in causation) „an idea 
illegitimate in science‟ (ibid.), and this program was successful, since in their 
work „the logical development of the process of eliminating the concept of force 
from mechanics was completed‟ (ibid., p.229, also p.241).  
Peter Alexander had a very similar reading of The Principles of 
Mechanics as „an attempt to rewrite classical mechanics in such a way as to 
exhibit its systematic nature, increasing its rigour, reducing its assumptions to a 
minimum, and keeping it as empirical and nonmetaphysical as possible‟ 
(Alexander 1967, p.492). He interpreted Hertz‟s aims, in that book, as being 
„firmly in the spirit of his teachers [Helmholtz and Kirchoff] and of Ernst Mach‟ 
(ibid.).  
John Blackmore, the author of a well-known book on Mach‟s work, life, 
and influence, also interprets Hertz‟s mechanics as being „couched 
within…Mach‟s philosophy of science‟ (Blackmore 1972, p.119)).2 Hertz, 
Blackmore claims, based his own „“modern physics” largely on Mach‟s 
philosophy of science‟ (ibid.).  
It is somewhat ironic that the latest representative of this reading should 
be Joseph Kockelmans, a philosopher who has pronounced hermeneutic-
phenomenological leanings. He follows Jammer to the letter in his exposition of 
Hertz, arguing that „the concept of force gradually developed, from being a 
basic concept with a clearly defined content in Newton‟s Principia, into a 
merely auxiliary, or perhaps intermediate, concept of primarily methodological 
importance under Kirchoff and von Helmholtz‟ (Kockelmans 2002, p.99). 
„Jammer correctly observes‟, says Kockelmans, „that with the works of Mach, 
Kirchoff, and Hertz the logical development of the process of eliminating the 
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 Blackmore says, in full, „couched within Kant‟s epistemology and Mach‟s philosophy of science‟.  
concept of force from mechanics altogether was finally completed‟ (ibid., 
p.103).  
This positivist interpretation of Hertz insists on something very important 
which is often missed or denied by other sorts of commentators: Hertz is trying 
to replace the Newtonian concept of force. Most of those interested in Hertz 
because of his influence on Wittgenstein, in particular, fail to recognise that 
Hertz is trying to „clarify‟ the Newtonian concept of force only by eliminating it 
as a basic concept. Those who assimilate Hertz to positivism are absolutely 
right about this, and avoid the trap of interpreting Hertz as some kind of proto-
Wittgensteinian or analytic philosopher.
3
  
 In what follows, I shall address the general question of whether Hertz‟s 
views are rightly characterised as positivistic, as well as the specific issue of the 
relations between his views on mechanics and those of Mach, who was very 
influential at the time, and is now generally thought of as the leading 
representative of positivism at the turn of the twentieth century.
4
 Hertz and 
Mach were concerned with similar issues, and there are certain similarities 
between their views. Hertz‟s program of eliminating forces from mechanics 
(endorsed by Jammer and Kockelmans, among others), certainly seems 
positivistic. Mach seems to have approved of the idea. Nevertheless, I want to 
enter some reservations about characterising Hertz as an ally of Mach, or as a 
positivist.  
 
Hertz and Mach: Mutual Admiration  
Hertz and Mach read one another‟s work, referred to one another, and 
certainly admired one another. Hertz first read Mach‟s The Science of 
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4
 I shall not be concerned with whether it is right to characterise Mach as a positivist, partly because the 
commentators discussed here agree in this characterisation, and partly because Mach himself apparently became 
resigned to the designation.  
Mechanics, the first edition of which appeared in 1883, in March 1884.
5
 In his 
own book he pays compliment to Mach, numbering him among „distinguished 
physicists‟ (p.8), and remarking in his Preface that „In a general way I owe very 
much to Mach‟s splendid book on the development of mechanics‟.6  
Naturally, Mach, for his part, was as aware as any contemporary physicist 
of Hertz‟s achievements in the field of electromagnetism. But he also expressed 
his admiration for Hertz‟s work in mechanics. He read Hertz‟s book some time 
between its publication in 1894 and the appearance of the third German edition 
of The Science of Mechanics in 1897, to which he added a section in which he 
says some very complimentary things about Hertz‟s book. Hertz‟s Mechanics, 
he says, „marks a distinct advance‟ in the right direction (p.317), „his own novel 
views must be regarded as a great step in advance‟ (p.320); the book „must be 
read by everyone interested in mechanical problems‟ (p.317). Mach even seems 
to have thought that, despite a difference in their general perspectives, Hertz‟s 
actual ideas in mechanics were very similar to his own. In the preface to the 
second edition of his History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of 
Energy, composed significantly later (in 1909), he says „[Hertz‟s ideas] coincide 
as exactly as is possible with my own, considering that Hertz was a supporter of 
the mechanical and atomic physics and a follower of Kant‟ (Mach 1909, p.11).  
 
The Aim of Science  
On the issue of what science is for, there does seem to be a genuine point 
of contact between Hertz and Mach. Blackmore has argued that a complex, 
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 The exact way this compliment is phrased might suggest to modern readers that Hertz could have meant 
almost anything by it, maybe even that he disagreed with Mach‟s book! But there is no reason to read back our 
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three-part specification of the aim of science gradually emerges in Mach‟s 
work. The „internal‟ aim of science, for Mach, is the description and relation of 
sensations. Its „intermediate‟ aim is „scientific economy‟ – „the most complete, 
consistent, cohesive… world picture, a world picture of the greatest possible 
stability‟ (Mach 1900, p.366). And its „external‟ purpose is to provide humans 
with as good a means of orienting themselves as possible.  
Hertz, unfortunately, has much less to say on the issue, which he 
mentions explicitly only in the very first passage of his Introduction. There he 
suggests that the main task of science is simple, and singular:  
 
The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our 
conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the 
anticipation of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in 
accordance with such anticipation. As a basis for the solution of this 
problem we always make use of our knowledge of events which have 
already occurred, obtained by chance observation or by rearranged 
experiment (p.1).  
 
This specification of the aim of science (which may, of course, have been only 
part of a fuller specification which Hertz could have given) has two aspects 
congenial to positivists. First, it presents scientific discovery in an inductivist 
way. Second, in referring only to the anticipation of future events, it is 
surprisingly thin and instrumentalist. Blackmore (ibid., p.169) suggests that 
Hertz actually influenced Mach in his conception of the „intermediate‟ aim of 
science. But what Blackmore has in mind is not the instrumentalistic aspect of 
Hertz‟s conception, but his use of the concept of a „world-picture‟ (Weltbild 
(p.25), Bild des Weltganzen (p.26)), which Mach (as well as Ludwig 
Boltzmann) seems to have taken on.
7
 It is worth noting, though, that Mach‟s 
first reaction was to complain about Hertz‟s conception:  
 
People require of science that it should prophesy, and Hertz uses that 
expression in his posthumous Mechanics. But, natural as it is, the 
expression is too narrow. The geologist and the palaeontologist, at times 
the astronomer, and always the historian and the philologist, prophesy, so 
to speak, backwards. The descriptive sciences, like geometry and 
mathematics, prophesy neither forwards nor backwards, but seek from 
given conditions the conditioned. Let us say rather: Science completes in 
thought facts that are only partly given. (Mach 1894, p.253).  
 
Hertz does indeed use the terms „vorauszusehen’ and „Voraussicht’ (to foresee, 
foresight) in the German original of the passage quoted above. Mach‟s objection 
shows (perhaps surprisingly to those who think of him as a paradigm 
instrumentalist) that his own conception of the aim of science is broader than 
that to which Hertz gives expression. Hertz‟s specification of the aim of science 
seems at least as positivistic as Mach‟s.  
 
Criteria for Evaluating Scientific Theories  
For Hertz it is important that our scientific „images‟ are not 
predetermined by experience, but consciously constructed under the guidance of 
three requirements, one logical, one empirical, and one pragmatic. He proposes, 
famously, that a scientific „image‟ [Bild] must be logically permissible [logische 
zulässig] in that it must not contradict „the laws of our thought‟ (p.2).  It must be 
correct [richtig], in that its „essential relations‟ must not contradict the „relations 
of external things‟ (ibid.). And finally it must be appropriate [zweckmässig] in 
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that it must represent as many of the essential relations of its object as possible, 
while minimising the number of „superfluous or empty relations‟ (ibid.) it 
contains.  
If, in emphasising the freedom and conscious activity involved in our 
construction of scientific images, Hertz had Mach himself in mind as a target, 
then his remarks are understandable, but misguided. Mach does occasionally 
say things which might lead one to interpret him as the kind of empiricist who 
thinks our theories are straightforwardly determined by experience. But these 
moments are outweighed by those in-depth discussions of particular scientific 
laws and principles, in which he clearly recognises that the relation between 
experience and theory is not direct. One of the major claims of The Science of 
Mechanics, after all, is that the „main result‟ of considering the development of 
dynamics is that „one great fact‟ or perception slowly emerged (p.306, cf. 
pp.478-9, 573). That fact, that bodies mutually determine in each other 
accelerations dependent on definite spatial and material circumstances was 
„embodied in‟ a great number of mechanical principles, and its perception was 
„not reached at once, but slowly and by degrees‟ (p.306).  
Nevertheless, Mach evidently considered that Hertz‟s insistence on 
freedom in theory-construction involved a misplaced emphasis. He countered 
that although our concepts (his preferred term) „are formed consciously and 
purposely by us‟, they „are nevertheless not formed altogether arbitrarily, but 
are the outcome of an endeavour on our part to adapt our ideas to our sensuous 
environment‟ (p.318). This biological, Darwinian aspect of Mach‟s 
methodology finds no echo in Hertz, but may be the root of the disagreement 
between them over the extent to which our theory-construction is constrained.  
Mach also finds other things to complain of in Hertz‟s discussion of 
logical permissibility. When Hertz argues that the images we form should be 
„such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the 
images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured‟ (p.1), 
Mach objects to the phrase „necessary consequents in nature‟ [die 
denknotwendigen Folgen der Bilder] because it appears to him to invoke a kind 
of natural or non-logical necessity. Against this, Mach wants to insist that  
 
logical necessity…is the only necessity that we have knowledge of. The 
belief in a necessity obtaining in nature arises only in case where our 
concepts are closely enough adapted to nature to ensure a correspondence 
between the logical inference and the fact. But the assumption of an 
adequate adaptation of our ideas can be refuted at any moment by 
experience. (p.318).  
 
Finally, although Mach values clearness, he doesn‟t have the same 
concern with logical clearness that Hertz has, perhaps because he only really 
recognises two classes of statement: those expressing matters of experience, and 
those expressing matters of „arbitrary convention‟ (p.304), i.e. definitions. The 
only one of Hertz‟s three requirements to which Mach does not object is that of 
„appropriateness‟ but, as we shall see, Mach‟s assimilation of this feature to his 
own idea of „economy‟ is problematic.  
 
Criticisms of Newtonian Mechanics  
Hertz and Mach are both well-known as critics of Newtonian mechanics. 
Both distinguish between its content and its form (Hertz pp.8-9, Mach pp.245, 
555), and both are convinced that its existing defects are defects of form or 
presentation only, not of content.  
They do seem to disagree, though, about how serious those defects are. 
Hertz indicted the customary (Newtonian-Lagrangian) image of mechanics in 
two respects. By the end of his Introduction, he has decided that despite its 
practical utility, the current form of the customary image of mechanics is 
neither fully logically permissible, nor fully appropriate.  
Mach, however, insisted that „Hertz‟s criticisms of existing systems of 
mechanics cannot be accepted in all their severity‟ (pp.319-20). He felt that the 
objections Hertz levelled on the score of logical permissibility applied only to 
„logically defective expositions, such as Hertz doubtless had in mind from his 
student days‟ (p.319). When, for example, Hertz suggested that the customary 
representation of mechanics counts an object‟s inertia twice (once as inertia, and 
once as centrifugal force) (p.6), Mach protested that, even as far back as 
Huygens and Newton, mechanics had not fallen into this confusion.  
Mach also objected to Hertz‟s characterization of forces as „idle wheels‟, 
and thus to Hertz‟s objection on the score of appropriateness. To characterize 
forces as being frequently „empty-running wheels‟, Mach says, „as being 
frequently not demonstrable to the senses, can scarcely be permissible‟ (p.319). 
Here, though, Mach seems to have misunderstood Hertz‟s objection. Hertz 
objects to Newtonian forces not because they are unobservable, but because 
they are inoperative. He calls them „leehrgehende Nebenräder‟ (idling side-
wheels)
8
 not because one cannot observe them, but because most of them don‟t 
actually produce motion.  
 Further disagreement between Hertz and Mach appears at the more 
detailed level of their reasons for objecting to the current form of mechanics. 
For Mach, „the present form of our science of mechanics rests on an historical 
accident‟ (p.316), in that the Newtonian development of Galilean mechanics has 
been preferred to others (such as the Huygenian) which could just as well have 
been pursued. He also considers that the current form of the principles of 
mechanics still reflect their origins in theology (p.554). Mach‟s well-known 
objections and amendments to the Newtonian form of mechanics mean that 
although he reveres and admires Newton, he feels that „we can only 
comprehend with difficulty [Lord Kelvin‟s] opinion that the Newtonian 
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doctrines still remain the best and most philosophical foundation that can be 
given‟ (p.305). Mach judges that although Hertz‟s criticisms of previous 
representations of mechanics „contain some very noteworthy epistemological 
considerations‟, they nevertheless „from our point of view… stand in need of 
certain modifications‟ (p.318).  
 
Economy and Appropriateness 
According to Mach, „Hertz‟s criterion of appropriateness coincides with 
our criterion of economy‟ (p.318).9 This is by no means clearly so.  
Economy is the central, if not the single, desideratum in Mach‟s account 
of science; his „fundamental conception of the nature of science‟ is of 
„Economy of thought‟ (p.xxiii). „Physics‟, he says elsewhere, „is experience, 
arranged in economical order‟ (Mach 1882, p.197). „All physical ideas and 
principles are succinct directions, frequently involving subordinate directions, 
for the employment of economically classified experiences, ready for use‟ 
(ibid., p.204). Because it is his central desideratum, Mach certainly applied the 
concept of economy in different ways, but his core idea was to construe it as a 
matter of minimising the effort that one expends in getting to grips with a given 
subject-matter. Science is communicated „in order that one man may profit by 
the experience of another and be spared the trouble of accumulating it for 
himself‟ (p.577).  
 
The communication of scientific knowledge always involves description, 
that is, a mimetic reproduction of facts in thought, the object of which is 
to replace and save the trouble of new experience. Again, to save the 
labor of instruction and of acquisition, concise, abridged description is 
sought. This is really all that natural laws are. (Mach 1882, pp.192-3).  
                                           
9
 Alexander, we saw above, endorses this thought.  
 Economy, for Mach, is a matter of labour-saving.  
Hertz‟s „appropriateness‟ is only like this to a certain extent, being more 
limited in scope. Appropriateness, for him, contains two features, lexically 
ordered. The first (but less clear), distinctness, refers to the ability of an image 
to picture as many as possible of its object‟s „essential relations‟. The second 
and more important feature, simplicity, is a matter of the image‟s containing as 
few „superfluous or empty relations‟ as possible. This second feature concerns 
labour-saving in that an image is simple, for Hertz, to the extent that it avoids 
postulating entities or properties which perform no function. However, while, 
for Mach, science itself is always ultimately in the service of our practical ends 
(its „external purpose‟, detailed above), Hertz makes it absolutely clear that the 
appropriateness he is concerned with „has no reference to practical applications 
or the needs of mankind‟ (p.40, emphasis added). He concedes completely that 
with respect to such purposes, „it is scarcely possible that the usual 
representation of mechanics, which has been devised expressly for them, can 
ever be replaced by a more appropriate system‟ (ibid.). This is an anathema to 
Mach. Because, for him, „economy‟ is a portmanteau category, an ideally 
„economic‟ theory would be one that met every demand we could make of it. 
Noting Hertz‟s concession, Mach rightly observes that Hertz himself, „with his 
characteristic candour, admits [that for practical purposes the usual 
representation of mechanics is preferable to his own]‟ (p.324). Hertz, he also 
claims, „partly retracts his criticism…; or at any rate, he qualifies it‟ (p.319). 
But although the dialectic of Hertz‟s Introduction means that he does not end up 
pressing home all of the possible objections which he considers, still, by the end 
of that Introduction he has complaints about the customary representation on 
two of the three possible scores (logical permissibility and appropriateness), and 
he leaves the further question of that representation‟s correctness to be decided 
by our future experience.  
 Observability, Experience, Perception  
For Hertz, of course, just as for Mach, observability, accessibility to 
perceptual experience, has the central role in the specification of what makes an 
image „correct‟: „What enters into the images for the sake of correctness is 
contained in the results of experience, from which the images are built up‟ (p.3). 
When discussing the merits of the customary image of mechanics, he says: „No 
one will deny that within the whole range of our experience up to the present 
the correctness is perfect; that all those characteristics of our image, which 
claim to represent observable relations of things, do really and correctly 
correspond to them‟ (p.9). Hertz‟s second requirement on images is thus 
undoubtedly one that an empiricist can endorse.  
The most pregnant passage in which Hertz uses such concepts pertaining 
to perceptual experience is the one in which he deploys his objection to the 
customary image on the score of appropriateness:  
 
The weight of a stone and the force exerted by the arm seem to be as real 
and as readily and directly perceptible as the motions which they produce. 
But it is otherwise when we turn to the motions of the stars. Here the 
forces have never been the objects of direct perception; all our previous 
experiences relate only to the apparent position of the stars. Nor do we 
expect in future to perceive the forces. The future experiences which we 
anticipate again relate only to the position of these luminous points in the 
heavens. It is only in the deduction of future experiences from the past 
that the forces of gravitation enter as transitory aids in the calculation, and 
then disappear from consideration. Precisely the same is true of the 
discussion of molecular forces, of chemical actions, and of many electric 
and magnetic actions. And if after more mature experience we return to 
the simple forces, whose existence we never doubted, we learn that these 
forces which we had perceived with convincing certainty, were after all 
not real. More mature mechanics tells us that what we believed to be 
simply the tendency of a body towards the earth is not really such: it is 
the result, imagined only as a single force, of an inconceivable number of 
actual forces which attract the atoms of the body towards all the atoms of 
the universe. Here again the actual forces have never been the objects of 
previous experience; nor do we expect to come across them in future 
experiences. Only during the process of deducing future experiences from 
the past do they glide quietly in and out (p.12).  
 
Jammer and Alexander take this passage to be evidence that Hertz endorsed an 
instrumentalistic view of explanation. Jammer says that for Hertz, in advanced 
problems such as those of celestial mechanics, force is „a transitory aid in the 
calculation and disappears finally from our considerations‟ (ibid., p.226). For 
Alexander, Hertz „looks askance at forces that “cancel out in the calculations” 
as robbing an explanation of its simplicity, or what Mach calls its economy‟ 
(p.493).
10
  
 It is not so clear, though, that Hertz is really endorsing this 
instrumentalistic view. The very next thing he says suggests otherwise:  
 
But even if the forces have only been introduced by ourselves into nature, 
we should not on that account regard their introduction as inappropriate. 
We have felt sure from the beginning that unessential relations could not 
be altogether avoided in our images. All that we can ask is that these 
relations should, as far as possible, be restricted, and that a wise 
discretion should be observed in their use. But has physics always been 
sparing in the use of such relations? Has it not rather been compelled to 
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fill the world to overflowing with forces of the most various kinds – with 
forces which never appeared in the phenomena, even with forces which 
only came into action in exceptional cases? (pp.12-13).  
 
He goes on immediately to advert to the sheer number of forces (all the 
gravitational, magnetic, electric, inter-atomic ones) which the customary image 
postulates in the case of a piece of iron resting on a table, saying 
 
Some of these forces are not small: if only a part of these forces were 
effective, this part would suffice to tear the iron to pieces. But, in fact, all 
the forces are so adjusted amongst each other that the effect of the whole 
lot is zero; that in spite of a thousand existing causes of motion, no 
motion takes place; that the iron remains at rest. Now if we place these 
conceptions before unprejudiced persons, who will believe us? Whom 
shall we convince that we are speaking of actual things, not images of a 
riotous imagination? (p.13).  
 
This strongly suggests that the question, for Hertz, is not whether we have used 
forces only as transitory aids to calculation, but whether we have simply 
postulated unbelievably many forces. His objection to the current form of the 
customary representation is more a matter of ontological profligacy than 
epistemological inaccessibility. Thus it is not the objection that Mach thinks it 
is, and neither is it the objection that advocates of the positivist reading suppose. 
While this kind of objection to forces is one that a positivist might nevertheless 
accept, it isn‟t as characteristic of positivism as the objections that are often 
attributed to Hertz.  
Nevertheless, when discussing the „energeticist‟ representation of 
mechanics, whose central idea is that physical phenomena should be explained 
in terms of laws governing energy-transformations, Hertz imposes a strongly 
empiricist requirement. The energeticist, he says, must „indicate clearly by what 
concrete experiences we ultimately establish the presence of mass and energy‟ 
(p.15).
11
 This requirement does not seem to be imposed merely because 
energeticists themselves accepted it, rather than because Hertz himself did so. In 
this same discussion, he admits that energeticism‟s advantage over the 
customary representation of mechanics lies in the fact that „in the hypotheses of 
the problems there only enter characteristics which are directly accessible to 
experience, parameters, or arbitrary co-ordinates of the bodies under 
consideration; that the examination proceeds with the aid of these characteristics 
in a finite and complete form; and that the final result can again be directly 
translated into tangible experience‟ (p.18). This certainly seems to constitute an 
advantage to Hertz, as well as to the energeticist. Having discussed the 
appropriateness of energeticism he says „These are the merits which have 
endeared this method to present-day physics‟ (p.18), and he concludes that the 
energeticist representation of mechanics is indeed „appropriate‟.  
 
‘Concealed Masses’ and their Operation  
There can be little doubt, then, that Hertz really did accept this empiricist 
requirement to indicate by what experiences we establish the presence of the 
phenomena answering to all the basic concepts of our physical theories. This, 
however, sheds a curious light on his own representation of mechanics. 
Consider his procedure in introducing the „concealed masses‟ [verborgene 
Massen] and „concealed motions‟ [verborgene Bewegungen] which his own 
system postulates (p.26). It is somewhat unusual, and noteworthy. He begins by 
issuing a warning:  
 
                                           
11
 Likewise, he later insists that „we have to specify by what simple, direct experiences we propose to define the 
presence of a store of energy and the determination of its amount‟ (p.21).  
If we try to understand the motions of bodies around us, and to refer them 
to simple and clear rules, paying attention only to what can be directly 
observed, our attempt will in general fail. We soon become aware that the 
totality of things visible and tangible do not form a universe conformable 
to law, in which the same results always follows from the same 
conditions. We become convinced that the manifold of the actual universe 
must be greater than the manifold of the universe which is directly 
revealed to us by our senses (p.25).  
 
This warning that one can never eliminate unobservable entities from mechanics 
is something neither Mach nor positivists could (in the final analysis) endorse. 
Neither is the lesson Hertz draws from it:  
 
If we wish to obtain an image of the universe which shall be well-
rounded, complete, and conformable to law, we have to presuppose, 
behind the things which we see, other, invisible things – to imagine 
confederates concealed beyond the limits of our senses (ibid.).  
 
In the customary (Newtonian-Lagrangian) and energeticist images, though, 
Hertz complains, the confederates introduced (viz., force and energy) are 
„entities of a special and peculiar kind‟ (ibid., emphasis added). There is, 
however, an alternative:  
 
[A]nother way lies open to us. We may admit that there is a hidden 
something at work, and yet deny that this something belongs to a special 
category. We are free to assume that this hidden something is naught else 
than motion and mass again, - motion and mass which differ from the 
visible ones not in themselves but in relation to us and to our usual means 
of perception. Now this mode of conception is just our hypothesis (ibid.).  
 In a subsequent discussion of the issue Hertz starts by claiming that in his own 
representation he is indeed complying with the empiricist requirement: „We first 
introduce the three independent fundamental ideas of time, space, and mass as 
objects of experience; and we specify the concrete sensible experiences by 
which time, mass, and space are to be determined‟ (p.26). But then he 
immediately says: „With regard to the masses we stipulate that, in addition to 
the masses recognisable by the senses, concealed masses can by hypothesis be 
introduced‟ (pp.26-7).  
Hertz, then, seems to have thought that he was respecting this empiricist 
requirement. He says of his own system that „all our statements represent 
possible experiences; if necessary, they could be confirmed by direct 
experiments, viz. by measurements made with models‟ (p.30). But his 
introduction of „concealed masses‟ and „concealed motions‟ seems in this 
respect like a trick. Having introduced the concept of mass in an empiricist way, 
he then feels free to postulate unobservable masses whose only difference from 
observable ones is supposed to be their unobservability. They are not supposed 
to be „entities of a special and peculiar kind‟, because despite being in-principle 
unobservable, they are more like observable masses than are forces, for 
example. This move certainly raises some important conceptual problems: can 
we, as it requires, deny that whether or not an object is observable supervenes 
on other, more basic properties? Could there really be objects which are exactly 
like one another, except that one is observable and the other not? Alexander, as 
we saw, claims that Hertz‟s book is „an attempt to rewrite classical mechanics… 
keeping it as empirical and nonmetaphysical as possible‟ (Alexander 1967, 
p.492). Hertz‟s concealed masses, though, may be „nonmetaphysical‟ in some 
sense, but this does not make them unproblematic. His system eliminates forces 
in favour not of observables but in favour of concealed masses and motions 
which are by definition and in principle unobservable, and which are not 
supposed to be mere temporary expedients, later to be discarded. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Hertz‟s replacements for forces are less acceptable to 
Mach than forces themselves. Mach complained that the latter „are decidedly in 
the advantage on this score, as compared with “hidden masses” and “hidden 
motions”‟ (p.319), which he considered „occult‟ (p.323). Neither did Mach 
think Hertz‟s system was as empirical as possible. In fact, he complained that it 
was just the opposite. The physical side of mechanical problems, he says, „is not 
only not disposed of, but is not even so much as touched, by the elaboration of 
such a formal mathematical system of mechanics‟ (p.322). Although Hertz‟s 
system gave a „beautiful ideal form‟ to mechanics, „its physical contents have 
shrunk to an apparently almost imperceptible residue‟ (pp.322-3).  
Notoriously, Hertz gave no examples at all of how his concealed masses 
might actually operate to produce observable motions. As Ludwig Boltzmann 
aptly commented, it was unfortunate that, in the same moment that Hertz 
created this „strikingly simple system of mechanics‟, „his lips became forever 
sealed to the thousand requests for clarification that are certainly not on the tip 
of my tongue alone‟ (Boltzmann 1974, pp.89-90). In the wake of his book‟s 
publication, a very few of Hertz‟s peers, students and followers did try to supply 
the needed illustrations. Mach was perhaps the first. In the case of a mass m, 
moving uniformly in a circle of radius r and with a velocity v, he suggests, 
instead of referring its movement to a postulated centripetal force „we might 
instead of this conceive the mass to be rigidly connected at the distance 2r with 
one of the same size having a contrary velocity‟ (p.324). But although he makes 
this suggestion, it is notable that Mach does so in order to support his view that 
to take Hertz‟s mechanics seriously in this way would be „to resort, even in the 
simplest cases, to fantastic and frequently questionable fictions, to which the 
given accelerations would be far preferable‟ (ibid.). Mach, in other words, 
illustrates how the concealed masses of Hertz‟s mechanics might operate only 
in order to suggest that the application of that mechanics is preposterous. For 
him, it is the equations governing the ways in which the motions of masses 
depend on one another that are „the essential thing,  - the thing established by 
experience‟ (p.321), rather than the forces or the connections between masses.  
Finally, it is true that Hertz insists on (what we would now call) 
operational definitions for the basic concepts of mechanics (§§298-300). But 
these are in addition to his prior definitions of space, time, and mass (§§2-4), 
which are supposed to be „a priori judgements in Kant‟s sense‟ (§1). Instead of 
constituting those concepts, as they would for a positivist, and thus being 
necessary conditions on their intelligibility, they merely connect those (already 
intelligible) concepts with experience.  
In sum, I suggest that despite broad agreement over the roles of 
observability and perceptual experience the interpretation and application of 
such features is rather different in Hertz and Mach. This comes out most clearly 
in their respective attitudes towards unobservable entities. It is not only 
empiricists, though, who may well feel that a trick is being executed in the 
introduction of „concealed masses‟. Mach was right to challenge the idea that 
they are an improvement on forces. He was right, however, not for his own 
empiricist reason, but because Hertz‟s concealed masses face worse conceptual 
problems than forces do.  
 
Attitudes to Atoms 
Hertz‟s attitude to the atomic theory certainly bears comparison with 
Mach‟s. Hertz was a pupil of Kirchoff, who exhibited a positivistic streak in his 
thought on this subject:  
 
To an investigator like Gustav Kirchoff, who was accustomed to rigid 
reasoning, it almost gave pain to see atoms and their vibrations wilfully 
stuck in the middle of a theoretical deduction. The arbitrarily assumed 
properties of the atoms may not affect the final result. The result may be 
correct. Nevertheless the details of the deduction are in great part 
presumably false; the deduction is only in appearance a proof. The earlier 
mode of thought in physics scarcely allowed any choice or any way of 
escape (Hertz, p.18).
12
  
 
Mach‟s exact attitude to atomism is a vexed issue but, in general, he took an 
equally hard line.
13
 In his earliest work (1862) it is true, he seems not only to 
have accepted the atomic-molecular theory „as a useful working model and 
hypothesis‟ (Hiebert 1970, p.79, cf. Brush 1968, pp.197-9), but also to have 
used it. By 1872, however, he had come to reject it with vehemence and, despite 
some later mellowing in his view, seems never to have been reconciled to it. 
Although he continued to admit the utility of atomism as an hypothesis, for him 
„the unreality of atoms…was a basic axiom‟ (Brush ibid., p.210).  
Hertz‟s attitude to atomism is not comparable to that of Mach, or 
Kirchoff. He does discuss atoms and atomism in several places, but none of 
those discussions should lead us to think that he shared a Machian or a positivist 
attitude. (Mach recognised this, as we saw, in identifying Hertz as „a supporter 
of the mechanical and atomic physics‟).  
In the famous passages (pp.12-13, quoted above) in which Hertz levels 
the „idle wheels‟ objection at the customary representation of mechanics, he is 
evidently sceptical about whether we should suppose that each atom in the 
universe is related to every other such atom by gravitational and 
electromagnetic forces. But it is the inoperative forces themselves he is sceptical 
about, not the atoms.  
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 Larry Laudan at one point suggests that perhaps Mach merely has „reservations‟ about atomic hypotheses, 
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 When discussing the „energeticist‟ representation, Hertz mentions that 
physicists find it attractive „Because in this way [physics] best avoids talking 
about things of which it knows very little, and which do not at all affect the 
essential statements under consideration‟ (p.17). The context makes it clear that 
this is a reference to atoms. But the view expressed should not be assimilated to 
Mach‟s. To say we know very little of atoms, or even that their existence does 
not (at the moment) affect our theories is not to deny their existence or to count 
assertions of their existence as meaningless. In fact it is clear from other places 
that Hertz doesn’t oppose atomism. His considered view is best expressed in 
this passage:  
 
We have already had occasion to remark that in tracing back phenomena 
to force we are compelled to turn our attention continually to atoms and 
molecules. It is true that we are now convinced that ponderable matter 
consists of atoms; and we have definite notions of the magnitude of these 
atoms and of their motions in certain cases. But the form of the atoms, 
their connection, their motion in most cases – all these are entirely hidden 
from us; their number is in all cases immeasurably great. So that although 
our conception of atoms is in itself an important and interesting object for 
further investigation, it is in no wise specially fit to serve as a known and 
secure foundation for mathematical theories (pp.17-18).  
 
For Hertz, although we are now convinced that matter consists of atoms, our 
conception of them is not yet a suitable basis for physical theory.
14
 They are 
„unknown systems‟ (p.21). Any properties we currently ascribe to them (such as 
shape, attractive or repulsive forces, etc.) are „arbitrarily assumed properties‟ 
(p.18). But this does not mean that Hertz considers atoms illegitimate 
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postulates. For one thing, he twice clearly acknowledges that Kelvin‟s theory of 
vortex atoms is one of the inspirations for his work (pp.26, 37). For another, 
when faced with the objection that there are in reality none of the „rigid 
connections‟ between material points which his mechanics requires, Hertz 
concedes that „[i]n seeking the actual rigid connections we shall perhaps have to 
descend to the world of atoms‟ (p.34, cf. §330). From an anti-atomist, such a 
concession would be unintelligible. The most that can be said about Hertz‟s 
mechanics, in this respect, is that it does not make reference to atoms. But this is 
because Hertz thinks of his mechanics as an intermediate level theory, a theory 
that will, with luck, remain valid whatever is discovered about the 
microphysical entities whose existence underpins mechanics.
15
 That this is no 
evidence that Hertz was an anti-atomist is clear from the fact that exactly the 
same can be said of the ether: his mechanics makes no mention of it, and yet we 
know that he not only believed in it, but considered its investigation to be „the 
all-important problem in physics‟ (Hertz 1889, p.286). There is no trace, in 
Hertz‟s mechanics, of Mach‟s attitudes to atoms as (at best) convenient fictions, 
temporary and transitional expedients (p.589). For Mach, atomic theories had 
already outlived their usefulness. Hertz, by contrast, seems to think they had yet 
to come into their own.  
 
The Mechanistic World-View  
At the very beginning of Hertz‟s Preface he explains that mechanics has a 
foundational status within physics: „all physicists agree that the problem of 
physics consists in tracing the phenomena of nature back to the simple laws of 
mechanics‟. Some have taken this to be a commitment to „the prevalent view of 
German physicists at the time that the prime task of physics was to reduce all 
phenomena to mechanics‟ (Mulligan 1994, pp.65-6, emphasis added, Lützen 
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2005, ch.3, cf. McCormach 1972, p.347). This would make Hertz an advocate 
of radical mechanism, the „mechanical world-view’, which had been of such 
importance in Germany from the 1830s. But although Hertz‟s project concerns 
the foundations of mechanics, there is in his text very little suggestion that other 
sciences should be reduced to physics, let alone to mechanics. In the book‟s 
Introduction he expressly limits the range of his new mechanics to inanimate 
nature, saying „how far its laws extend beyond this we leave as quite an open 
question‟ (p.38, see also §§318-22, §342). He takes it to be an advantage of his 
fundamental law that it „shows us what are the limits of this domain [viz., 
mechanics]‟ (p.38). Hertz is certainly a moderate mechanist, but the evidence 
that he is a radical one is inconclusive.  
Opposition to mechanism, though, is one of the central and unmistakable 
aspects of Mach‟s philosophy. After an initial phase as a mechanist, he came to 
consider the „mechanical world-view‟ a mere prejudice (pp.596ff.), associating 
it with the materialism and atomism which he eschewed.
16
 The physico-
mechanical view of the world, for him, was a result of an unacceptable belief in 
the magical power of science (Mach 1882, pp.187-9), and he looked forward to 
a cooperation between natural science and psychology whose results would „far 
outstrip those of modern mechanical physics‟ (ibid., p.212). Mechanical 
hypotheses, he insisted, effect no genuine economy (p.599). For Mach, 
mechanics is just one branch of physics among others, and neither its historical 
priority nor anything else suggests that it is the foundation of physics, let alone 
of all science (p.612).  
If I am right that Hertz is merely a moderate mechanist, it may seem 
ironic that Mach later rails against Hertz‟s restriction of his own mechanics to 
inanimate nature (Mach 1905, p.183, note 6). He does so, however, because for 
Mach only when physics is conceived to have a narrow base (e.g. mechanics) 
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can it be assured of not being applicable to biological processes. Such processes 
need not be a mystery to physics, if the latter is properly (i.e. widely) conceived.  
 
Attitudes to Metaphysics 
Hertz‟s attitude to metaphysics is very different from that of Mach. He 
only talks of metaphysics once, when discussing the logical permissibility and 
appropriateness of the energeticist system. It can be objected to this system, he 
points out, that Hamilton‟s principle (or whatever other integral principle is 
selected) attributes intentions to inanimate nature. The usual answer to this 
objection, which physics nowadays keeps ready is, Hertz says, that  
 
these considerations are based upon metaphysical assumptions; that 
physics has renounced these, and no longer recognises it as a duty to meet 
the demands of metaphysics. It no longer attaches weight to the reasons 
which used to be urged from the metaphysical side in favour of principles 
which indicate design in nature, and thus it cannot lend ear to objections 
of a metaphysical character against these same principles (p.23).  
 
But this „usual answer‟, as Mach makes very clear in his comments on Hertz‟s 
book, is Mach‟s answer. Mach does not think „the case with energic mechanics 
so bad as Hertz would have it‟ (p.319). Whereas Hertz objects that the 
employment of minimum principles „involves the assumption of purpose and 
presupposes tendencies directed toward the future‟, Mach claims that his own 
book „shows…quite distinctly that the simple import of minimum principles is 
contained in an entirely different property from that of purpose‟ (ibid.). Hertz, 
however, not only fails to endorse this „usual answer‟, he objects to it:  
 
If we had to decide upon such a matter we should not think it unfair to 
place ourselves rather on the side of the attack rather than of the defence. 
A doubt which makes an impression on our mind cannot be removed by 
calling it metaphysical; every thoughtful mind as such has needs which 
scientific men are accustomed to denote as metaphysical (p.23).  
 
This remarkably conciliatory comment fits neither the classical positivist 
attitude, according to which metaphysics forms only an early phase in the 
development of science, nor Mach‟s attitude, which is relentlessly critical of 
metaphysics. Indeed, if one had to identify anyone as the most likely target of 
Hertz‟s comment, it would have to be Mach.  
 
Eliminating Forces?  
Finally, what of the suggestion that Hertz and Mach are involved in a 
common programme, for the elimination of force from physics? Mach, it is true, 
does suggest the possibility of a future physics which would not contain the 
concept of force, and interprets Hertz‟s mechanics as a move in this direction 
(p.317). He also remarks that „modern physical science shows traces of 
fetishism… in its “forces”‟ (p.558). In general, though, he just isn‟t as 
concerned with the concept of force as Hertz was. The Science of Mechanics 
contains nothing one could call a critique of the concept of force. Mach is far 
more worried about the concept of mass (e.g. pp.237ff, 264ff), mainly because 
he thought that Newton had made a mess of it. Mach gives his own definition of 
mass (p.266), advertising it as the only possible rational definition of that 
concept (p.341). He even suggests that this definition would take „a more 
organic and more natural place in Hertz‟s mechanics than his own, for it 
contains implicitly the germ of his “fundamental law”‟ (p.341, note). By 
contrast, though, Mach seems entirely happy with Newton‟s definition of force, 
remarking that „It is, we may say, a matter of taste whether we shall embody the 
explication of the idea of force in one or several definitions. In point of 
principle the Newtonian definitions are open to no objections‟ (p.301). Of 
course he does not approve of the metaphysical idea that forces are „unknown 
causes‟ (p.307), but as long as force is understood (à la Kirchoff, for example) 
as the product of mass and acceleration, Mach raises no objections to it. In fact 
at one point he appears to suggest (contrary to his own idea that there could be a 
forceless physics) that attempts to set aside the concept of force are fruitless:  
 
Force is any circumstance of which the consequence is motion. Several 
circumstances of this kind, however, each single one of which determines 
motion, may be so conjoined that in the result there shall be no motion. 
… The circumstances determinative of motion that are best known to us, 
are our own volitional acts – our innervations. In the motions which we 
ourselves determine, as well as in those to which we are forced by 
external circumstances, we are always sensible of a pressure. Thence 
arises our habit or representing all circumstances determinative of motion 
as something akin to volitional acts – as pressures. The attempts we make 
to set aside this conception, as subjective, animistic, and unscientific, fail 
invariably (p.95, emphasis added).  
 
It is hard to square this remark with the way Jammer and Kockelmans read 
Mach, as relentlessly striving to eliminate the concept of force from mechanics. 
Mach may have had that idea, but it figures only peripherally in his critique of 
existing mechanics. For him, the concept of pressure, at least, which is the 
phenomenal ground of the concept of force, has a secure place in our ontology.  
 
The Fate of Hertz’s Mechanics  
Earlier I commended those who take the positivist reading of Hertz for 
recognising something which some other commentators (those interpreting him 
as a proto-analytic philosopher) often get wrong – the fact that he is trying to 
replace the concept of force. However, both these kinds of commentators are 
regularly wrong about something else of significance: they far too readily 
assume the success of Hertz‟s project. Kockelmans, for example, declares that 
„In the space of some 250 pages, Hertz effectively shows that it is indeed 
possible to give a mechanical account of all known phenomena of nature‟ on the 
basis of his own assumptions (ibid., p.108). For this to be true, Hertz‟s 
mechanics would have to meet some reasonable set of requirements on 
scientific theories, e.g. that it be logically permissible, empirically adequate, and 
as „appropriate‟ as any other system of mechanics. Hertz, it is true, claimed that 
his mechanics had these virtues. But the verdicts of those who came after him 
ought to cast serious doubt on this. All the leading physicists and scientifically-
oriented philosophers of Hertz‟s generation, and of the next one, (Helmholtz, 
Mach, Boltzmann, Lorentz, FitzGerald, Einstein, Russell, Poincaré, Duhem) 
reacted to his book. Almost all of them found its new mechanics interesting and 
beautiful, but either baffling or unsuccessful, or both. This reaction cannot be 
written off by the reminder that these people are scientists, whereas Hertz‟s aim 
is philosophical. These are the great philosopher-scientists of two generations. 
Hertz certainly intended his work to be intelligible to them and to make a 
difference to their activities, since his project is supposed to allow us to make 
progress in physics (Preface). But despite a few attempts to apply Hertz‟s 
mechanics, it cannot be said to have been a success. The concept of force might 
be thought to have eventually succumbed to elimination in Einstein‟s general 
theory of relativity, but not by Hertz‟s method.  
 
Conclusion  
In sum, Hertz and Mach admired one another‟s work, and were in broad 
agreement over the aim of science and the deficiencies of the Newtonian 
representation of mechanics. Their detailed critiques of this representation, 
however, differed in significant respects, some of which can be traced at least in 
part to divergences in their criteria for evaluating scientific theories. Hertz and 
Mach differed in other, more general philosophical respects, too. They had 
different attitudes towards the programme of mechanical explanation, towards 
metaphysics, towards unobservables in general and towards atoms and 
„concealed masses‟ in particular. Mach, it transpires, was right in identifying 
Hertz as „a supporter of the mechanical and atomic physics and a follower of 
Kant‟ (Mach 1909, p.11). His judgement that, modulo these differences, Hertz‟s 
ideas „coincide as exactly as is possible with my own‟ (ibid.), overplays their 
similarities, but does so less than some of Mach‟s sympathisers who have tried 
to enlist Hertz in his cause.  
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